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Abstract This paper proposes a developmental view on imagination: from this
perspective, imagination can be seen as triggered by some disrupting event, which
generates a disjunction from the person’s unfolding experience of the “real” world,
and as unfolding as a loop, which eventually comes back to the actual experience.
Examining recent and classical theorization of imagination in psychology, the paper
opposes a deficitary view of imagination to an expansive notion of imagination. The
paper explores Piaget, Vygotsky, Harris and Pelaprat & Cole consider: 1) What does
provoke a “rupture” or disjunction? 2) What are the psychological processes involved
in the imaginary loop? 3) What nourishes such processes? 4) What are the conse-
quences of such imaginary loop, or what does it enable doing? The paper proposes to
adopt an expansive view of imagination, as Vygotsky proposed—a perspective that
has been under-explored empirically since his seminal work. To stimulate such
sociocultural psychology of imagination, two empirical examples are provided, one
showing how children make sense of metaphor in an experimental setting, the other
showing a young person using a novel met at school as symbolic resource.
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Imagination has been the object of attention since antiquity, and regularly
comes to the fore of philosophical or scientific reflection (see Byrne 2005;
Crapanzano 2004; Furlong 2004; Murphy et al. 2010; Roth 2007). In this paper
we want to synthesize some of the classical contributions to developmental
psychology, and show the limits of some of the dichotomies and divisions
traditionally raised by the issue. Rather than a chronologic perspective, we
propose an analytic one; eventually, approaching the issue from a sociocultural
perspective, we sketch an alternative model to apprehend imagination.
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Many debates associated with imagination were simply due to wider discussions in
the history of occidental thinking—such as debates between the cognitive or affective
nature of thinking,1 its truth value, etc.—and we will not address them. One debate is
specifically associated with imagination: is the notion of imagination designating the
simple capacity to form images that reproduce reality, or shall it designate images
which are actual new creations?2 From a constructivist, pragmatist or a sociocultural
perspective, the opposition does not really hold: in effect, if we admit the irrevers-
ibility of time, then any representation of the world is inevitably also and already a
new construction (James 1890)—it always implies representing (Valsiner 2003).
However, there might be a tension between images that tend to offer a stable or
continuous experience of the world, or images of what is and others, which precisely
offer novel views, perspectives or alternative experiences—images of what could be.
Yet such tension between preserving continuity and triggering change is at the core of
psychological development in general (de Moraes Ramos de Oliveira and Valsiner
1997). In this paper, however, we will limit ourselves to approaches of imagination
that consider it foremost as creative, not reproductive: this will allow us to think
imagination as a form of enrichment, or expansion, of one’s experience and under-
standing of the world.
Imagination as Loop: Gap Filling or Expansion
Our starting point is the observation that, from a developmental perspective, considering
that thinking or experience unfolds in time, most psychological theories of imagination
can be seen as theories of processes engaged by a sort of “rupture” of the flow of
thinking or relating to reality. The idea finds its inspiration in Peirce’s notion of
“irritation” due to the suspension of belief in things as they are (Peirce 1877), and can
designate any disruption of the taken-for-granted of one’s experience (Zittoun 2006a).
Most theories of imagination consider that (creative) imagination—as process—differs
from people’s thinking about “reality”—their material environment given by their
senses, the presence of actual social others, etc. Imagination always seems to open a
different space, or a different modality of thinking, which eventually terminates when
the person “comes back” to reality. Imagination can be seen as an excursion; we will say
that imagination, as process, create “loops” out of the present, here-and-now of expe-
riences connected to “real” objects. However, how this loop is conceived of and
descripted depends on authors.
Drawing on Hume (1896) (see Collier 1999; Furlong 2004), Pelaprat and Cole
(2011) have recently proposed to see imagination as “gap-filling” process:
1 Plato (427–346 bc) considered imagination as the lowest degree of knowledge. In the 16 and 16th
centuries, authors mostly mistrust its dangers: imagination is seen as “the mad in the house [la folle du
logis] (…) fertile source of aberration and illusion” (Malebranche 1990).
2 Kant saw imagination as one middle term between perception and concept, as bridging term between
actions and thinking. He proposed to distinguish on the one side “reproductive imagination”, the capacity to
represent objects in their absence, thus linking perception and memory, and on the other, “productive or
creative imagination”, freely operating on the basis of reality and combining images in a new way. This
distinction was then taken on later by many thinkers, in particular by Ribot (1900/2007) in the field of
psychology.
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“imagination is the process of resolving and connecting the fragmented, poorly
coordinated experience of the world so as to bring about a stable image of the world”
(Pelaprat and Cole 2011, p.399). According to such view, human experience is
inherently fragmented—because of specific physiological, cultural and developmen-
tal properties—and imagination is what gives people “a feeling of oneself in relation
to the world” (Pelaprat and Cole 2011, p. 399). As examples, the authors show that
we are able to see things as stable only because we “fill the gap” between the
permanent oscillation of our eye-movement which otherwise provide us with
fragmented images of the world. Similarly, even if comic books present us with a
series of apparently disconnected frames and situations, we can understand the story
line because we “fill the gap” between two pictured frame. Hence, filling the gap is a
necessary completion of our permanent incomplete apprehension of the world. We
believe that this basic proposal is actually implicitly present in many of past theori-
zations of imagination. Although this proposition if heuristically powerful, we also
believe that it is based on a deficitary understanding of imagination: it implies that for
some reasons due to human limitation (biological, developmental, etc.), our modes of
understanding or acting in the world have deficits and that imagination can offer some
reparation or completion.
In contradistinction with this understanding of imagination, other authors consider
imagination as a process having its own status and importance. For them, imagination
allows taking distance from the here-and-now from experience; it allows to consider
alternatives, to reread the past or to open possible futures; at times playful, it can be
seen as rich in emotions, or as basis of invention; it is then associated with daily
creativity, as well as with aesthetic experiences and scientific or political explorations
(see Ricoeur 1978; Vygotsky 2004, 2011, 1971; Winnicott 2001). In that sense,
imagination is necessary to human and cultural life, and it can potentially expand
what is otherwise possible in a given state of socio-historical constraints. According
to this second understanding, imagination becomes a form of expansion of human
experience. It is this idea of imagination as expansion of experience that we want to
highlight and promote in this paper.
Hence, we consider that the main theories of imagination are based on the idea that
it occurs in the flow of thinking, triggered by a disruption from a previous way of
relating to reality or others, that it demands a form of loop, before coming back to that
initial flow. Our working hypothesis is that imagination is triggered by a
temporary disjunction or misfit, or rupture, between the given of one’s expe-
rience of the world (as material, embodied, socially shared), and one’s ongo-
ing flow of thinking (Fig. 1). From there on, we will ask the following
questions to various models: 1) What does provoke a “rupture” calling for a
loop (seen as gap-filling, resp. expansion of experience); 2) What are the
psychological processes involved in that loop (seen as filling the gap, resp. as
expanding experience)?; 3) What nourishes this loop; 4) What are the conse-
quences of such loop, or what does it enable doing?
For this exploration, we will limit consider the work of developmental psycholo-
gists who have frontally addressed imagination and are usually considered as refer-
ences in that matter: Jean Piaget, Lev S. Vygotsky, Paul Harris, as well as Cole and
Pelaprat’s recent proposition, with a few additions of classical or recent contributions
when we need to suggest alternative views.
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What is it that Provokes a Rupture?
Authors that have written about imagination often include in their reflection some
considerations on what provokes the rupture that will induce imagination. Authors
usually choose one of two main options: either the rupture is imposed; or it is chosen.
The rupture, and therefore the movement towards imagination, is mainly consid-
ered as imposed when authors see it as accidentally provoked by people’s confron-
tation to daily life. One main cause of rupture can be defined as the resistance of
reality to the person’s apprehension. There are different versions of that argument.
A first series of arguments consider the gap as problem. For Piaget, the young
child who attempts apprehending reality is actually missing the required cognitive
capacities; his thinking is pre operatory, his accommodation capacities too weak
(Piaget 1962a, b). As a consequence, the child experiences the frustration of not
submitting realities to his desires: this is where the rupture appears. In that sense, this
vision pursues the Cartesian division: in Descartes’ (1996) understanding, imagina-
tion is generated in the person’s body and sensations when immerged in the world; as
such, it threatened one’s attempt to understand the world (the Cogito). Here, the
rupture is a problem, which eventually, in Piaget’s genetic view, will reduce with age.
For other authors, the gap has its origin not only in ontogenesis, but more
generally, in the phylogenetic and culturally developed traits that define human
capacities. Hence, Pelaprat and Cole (2011) propose that “imagination is a process
that resolves gaps generated by continuous constraint of past experience, cultural
history and phylogeny on the individual so that he or she may produce an image of
the world into which they can act and think in the present” (p.405). Born from
human’s limited capacities to apprehend reality, the rupture is seem as a “gap” which
might be temporal, perceptual, informational or conceptual—as such it is a given of
our human condition.
At another extreme, the rupture or disjunction—and imagination hence triggered—is
not only necessary, but can be deliberately created. Some authors thus identify the
deliberate technique one might engage to trigger imagination. Vygtosky, as an author
deeply interested in the arts, saw fiction and poems as triggers for imagination: engaging
with them demands accepting to enter in the counterfactual world of imagination
(Vygotsky 1971). Even more, in some cases, the gap is actively created by certain
activities of the person; hence, through play, the child is himself opening a zone of
Time
Imagination as expansion Experiencing present embodied world
Imagination as gap-filling
rupture
Fig. 1 Two conceptions of imagination
308 Integr Psych Behav (2013) 47:305–324
proximal development. Similar arguments have been developed by authors interested in
the psychology of fiction: people might be deliberately willing to abandon one’s usual
relationship to reality (Oatley 2011), and the loop is therefore triggered, created and
supported by various techniques (Zittoun 2013).
Worth mentioning here in his theory of metaphor Ricoeur (1975) high-
lights another modality of generating and cultivated loops. Ricoeur distin-
guishes conventional metaphors, or images that have become clichés, from
authentic, alive metaphors (“métaphores vives”). Only the latter expose the
person to some radical newness, which demands the simultaneous experience
of some “logical moment” and of a “sensual moment”. Hence, in a live
metaphor such as “the earth is blue like an orange” (Eluard 1929), one is
facing an illogical thought—oranges are not blue—and yet a perceptual
intuition of earth as round and grainy like an orange; the result of this
confrontation is a new aesthetic experience, renewing one’s views on the
earth if not on oranges. Here, a disjunction takes place between what is
perceived through the senses as ordinary and what calculation or understand-
ing says through the metaphor. In other words, in metaphor, the suspension
of the reference proper to ordinary language is the condition for the emer-
gence of a new way of looking at things; the epoché of ordinary reference,
says Ricoeur (1978), will provoke the jump in a poetic, imaginary mode—
what we call the loop—that contributes to the projection of new possibilities
of redescribing the world and so living in it.
Although less frequently studied by developmental psychologists, rituals as
well as drugs can be seen as generating ruptures and disjunctions. The first
one modify the appearances of reality, of people’s roles, their languages and
their actions (e.g. Obeyesekere 1990); the second transform people’s percep-
tions and capacities to apprehend reality (e.g.Díaz 2010). Often used in
conjunction, they thus deliberately create a disjunction between one’s usual
capacities to apprehend reality and the reality as it usually given to the person.
Hence, the rupture that triggers imagination might be passively experienced
or looked for, seen as weakness or as an occasion for some process to
happen. In all the cases, it seems triggered by a temporary disjunction or
misfit between the given of one’s experience of the world. Only for some
authors, the disjunction is a necessary bad, a gap that needs to be filled, and
for some others, it is a unique chance to explore alternative, or generate
radically new experiences.
What are the Psychological Processes Involved in the Imaginary Loop?
Having stated the existence of a rupture and disjunction, authors then develop
hypothesis about the nature of the imaginary processes taking place. Here
again, there is a major tendency to oppose the processes of imagination with
these of reasoning. Authors can deal in different manners with this great
divide (Goody 1977).
For Piaget, a “gapist”, the disjunction to be studied takes place, as suggested,
between the child’s desire and subjective world, and the given of reality; it is
translated as gap between “subjective assimilation”, and “representations adapted to
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reality” (1994a; b, p. 175, our translation; 1962).3 Piaget studied the progress of
intelligence, the establishment, elaboration and complexification of operative capac-
ities which will domesticate and suppress the gap. In line with his understanding of
the nature of the gap, Piaget radically distinguishes the processes involved in
imagination and in reasoning: they are of different nature. If reasoning demands the
mastery of organized operations, imagination is what is lacking these. In some texts,
imagination, associated with the child’s tendency to assimilate the world to his desire,
engages a pre-logical form of thinking, which is analogical and syncretic:
Syncretism is the children’s natural tendency to perceive through global vision
rather that differentiate details; it is, without analysis, to find immediate anal-
ogies between objects and words foreign to each other, between unrelated
natural phenomena, or to find reasons to random events—in short, it is the
tendency to relate everything with everything (Piaget 1978, p. 9, our translation,
1978 for official translation).4
In later texts, Piaget will rather distinguish two main types of cognitive functions:
the “figurative” and the “operative” ones:
The first tends to the figural aspects of reality. The operative aspect character-
izes the cognitive experience of deduction, which implies a modification of the
object, in order to reach transformations as such. (Piaget 1999, p. 22–23, our
translation, 1962 for official translation).5
Real intelligence consists in these transformations (operations), while figuration is
typical of pre-operatory thinking: figuration enters in imitation and other playful
processes. Eventually, what Piaget seems to ignore, is that playing demands not only
imitation, but also transformation: if a stick is turned into a gun, it has been object of
an operation as well (even if a syncretic one) (Cerchia 2011).
For Harris, the gap to be studied lies between a perceived thing or event and the
explanation one might produce to account for the cause of that thing or event, or for
what might have happened (alternative and counterfactual realities). The process of
filling the gap is for him clearly imagination. Paul Harris does not question the divide
between reason and imagination; rather, in his attempt to rehabilitate imagination, he
will show that imagination is mainly a variation of cognition. Hence, in his analysis
of a symbolic play between an adult and a 2 years old, Harris (2000) shows that when
the adult turns an imaginary tap located on the side of a shoe-box—figuring a bathtub—
3 « (…) l’évolution ultérieure de l’imagination symbolique consistera précisément en son amoindrissement
au profit de moyens de représentation plus adaptés au réel (…) Au fond, l’enfant n’a pas d’imagination, et
celle que le sens commun lui attribue se réduit à l’incohérence et surtout à l’assimilation subjective dont
témoignent ses transpositions. (p.138) (…) Mais pourquoi existe-t-il une assimilation du réel au moi, au lieu
que l’univers soit d’emblée assimilé à la pensée logique et expérimentale ? Tout simplement parce que cette
pensée n’est pas encore construite durant la petite enfance. (p. 175) » (Piaget 1994a, b).
4 « Le syncrétisme est la tendance spontanée des enfants à percevoir par visions globales au lieu de
discerner les détails, à trouver des analogies immédiatement, sans analyse, entre des objets et des mots
étrangers les uns aux autres, à lier entre eux des phénomènes naturels hétérogènes, à trouver une raison à
tout événement même fortuit, bref c’est la tendance à tout lier à tout (…). » (Piaget 1978, p. 9)
5 « On peut distinguer parmi [les fonctions cognitives] deux grandes catégories (…) de la connaissance :
l’aspect figuratif et l’aspect opératif. Le premier tend à atteindre les aspects figuraux de la réalité. L’aspect
opératif caractérise au contraire les formes d’expérience cognitive ou de déduction consistant à modifier
l’objet de manière à atteindre les transformations comme telles. » (Piaget 1999, p. 22–23)
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in which lies a teddy bear, and uses a small brick to rub its back, the child is able to infer
that the bear is wet and to continue the game accordingly, for instance by “drying” it with
a sheet of paper. For Harris, the child has thus accepted to enter in the pretend-world in
which boxes are baths, and is at the same time capable of engaging in a “real world”
causal reasoning (if a x is wet after a bath, one needs to dry it).
If Piaget was radically distinguishing imagination from reasoning, and Harris,
radically reducing imagination to reasoning, Vygotsky saw it as a specific process
actually combined with a whole range of other thinking processes.
Vygotsky approach to imagination is that it follows a disjunction from the normal
flow of experience, but that it is also an important component of development, a way to
expand ones experience. Imagination varies with the evolution of the thinking capaci-
ties. It follows the laws of development: the child first interacts with the social world,
and progressively internalizes language, concepts, categories, etc. Imagination is
allowed by the person’s internalization of language and semiotic system, which enable
to distance from here-and-now experience (Vygotsky 2011). Consequently, it allows
“playing” with these internalized semiotic means. It is about decomposing some of the
links and associations proposed by the social and cultural reality, and the exploration of
alternative association and hierarchizations. Hence, at a simple level, the playing child
can separate the name from an object, while maintaining its meaning; or an object can
change meaning (Vygotsky 2002). A bit of wood can be called “horse” and be used to
imitate a gallop; it can then be broken. In that sense, action follows meaning. This
capacity of disconnecting words from meaning thus creates the potential to explore new
combinations, beyond these that the child or the person could experiment in the daily
life. Yet as the person grows older, and develops the mastery of complex semiotic
systems and thus “superior” mental capacities—capacities to use signs to direct one’s
own thinking—then imagination can also operate on these. Imagination can thus play
with complex reasoning, memories, cultural elements, stories and bodies of knowledge.
Hence, imagination involves a specific process which always re-opens established
(socially stabilized) forms of knowledge, into new combinations. Imagination is thus a
complex thinking process, socially developed, which can be used as much to satisfy
one’s need for daydreaming than to find creative solutions to scientific, revolutionary or
artistic problems (Vygotsky 2004; Vygotsky 2011).
What Nourishes the Looping Processes?
If imaginary loops have such power—whether destructive or constructive—
they need to be supported by some forces or material, or somehow nourished.
For Piaget, imagination is nourished by children’s inner-lives, their imagination and
fantasies, what participates to their so-called “autistic” lives. At the time when Piaget
was writing on imagination he had been exposed to psychoanalysis, and it is somehow
inspired by his understanding of it that he considered emotions as the “fuel” for thinking
(1952). In imagination, children can thus satisfy untamed desires and unregulated envy.
Hence, imaginary play is submitted to the simple pleasure principle (Piaget 1969).6
6 « Pour une pensée égocentrique, le jeu tient en somme lieu de loi suprême. C’est l’un des mérites de la
psychanalyse d’avoir montré que l’autisme ne connaît pas l’adaptation au réel, parce que, pour le moi, le plaisir
est le seul ressort. La pensée autistique a ainsi pour unique fonction de donner aux besoins et aux intérêts une
satisfaction immédiate et sans contrôle, en déformant le réel pour l’adapter au moi » (Piaget 1978, p.193).
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In contrast, the child described by Harris (2000) seems to be using all his
developing knowledge and understanding about reality to nourish his imaginary
scenario: what he knows about bears, baths and wetness; only this knowledge is
now rearranged in a new reasoning. Other authors, observing children’s play, will
suggest that imagination is filled with social experiences—that is how the child plays
the mother, the doctor, etc. (Mead, as presented by Gillespie 2006). Imagination
seems like a general information processing machine.
To some extent, Vygotsky (2002) joins this type of reasoning. On the one hand, as
a psychological function, imagination develops in interaction with other superior
thinking functions, such as memory, verbal thinking or conceptual thinking:
Imagination and creativity connected with free processing of elements of
experience and with their free combinations absolutely require as a precursor
the internal freedom of thinking, action, and cognition that can be attained only
by the one who has already mastered the formation of concepts. (Vygotsky
2004, p. 153).
On the other hand, imagination is precisely playing with diverse “elements of
experience”, which might be direct experiences of activities, social interactions, and
we might suppose, diverse cultural experiences—verbal, artistic, fictional, and so on.
To some extent, Vygotsky’s reflection on art (1971) can be seen as expanding this
argument. For Vygotsky, reading a novel or following a theater piece requires to bring
in one’s flow of experience, and accept to have it guided by the book or the play.
Reversely, one could say that art creates or supports experiences of imagination
nourished by various artifacts. We will come back to this argument here below.
What are the Consequences of such Loops, or What Does it Enable Doing?
Why do we imagine for, what are the consequences of imagination, whether it is seen
as gap-filling or as expansion of experience? The authors diverge between those who
see it as mainly allowing people to have a better representation or mastery of reality,
and those who see it as having specific benefits.
Piaget’s deficit take on imagination implies that it should mainly… disappear and
be replaced by more adapted thinking capacities. However, he admitted that imagi-
nation could have some positive outcomes. Minimally, interviewed by an adult, the
child can thus find imaginary solutions which are “fabulations” simply because they
are amusing, or propose “whateverism” because he is bored (Piaget 1999). If any-
thing, imagination is distracting. Piaget recognized more positive functions to play
and imagination: because imagination allows re-living scenes without the demands of
reality, it can allow freeing oneself from internal tensions and frustrated desires
(Piaget 1994a, b). Eventually, once children are 7 years old, imagination will be
turned into creative thinking in reasoning.
Curiously, with their recent attempt to consider imagination as implying filling the
gap between percepts and concepts, or to complete the always partial and fragmentary
vision we have of the world, Pelaprat and Cole (2011) eventually suggest that
imagination has as major outcome to allow us to have a better representation of
reality. In other words, imagination as such is part of a deficit vision of human
intelligence, whose ultimate goal is to better adjust to reality.
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On the other hand, Paul Harris’s understanding of the processes of imagination
lead him to a much more positive view of their consequences. For him, first appearing
in children’s play, it will become the mental capacity that, all life long, enables
considering alternatives to reality (Harris 2007, p. 39). This imaginative capacity,
feeding cognitive and affective processes, brings us to anticipate, predict and react to
situations to which we have not been confronted; consider various possible conse-
quences to past or future events; and consider the possible causes of a given event. In
that sense, imagination supports our causal understanding of reality, and it has a
major adaptive role. Other contemporary authors, such as Singer and Singer (1992,
2005) expand such reading of the developmental role of imagination, mainly in
games, and suggest that it participates not only to cognitive development, but also
to social and emotional one.
Vygotsky’s expansive version of imagination has even broader consequences.
More fundamentally, for Vygotsky imagination allows the child, and then the adult,
to go beyond the limit of his or her understanding, and thus, to create his or her zone
of proximal development.
In play a child is always above his average age, above his daily behavior;
in play it is as though he were a head taller than himself… in play it is as
though the child were trying to jump above the level of his normal
behavior (…) The child moves forward essentially through play activity
(…) Play is the source of development and creates the zone of proximal
development. (Vygotsky 2002, p. 15)
As adults, play turns into imagination, which is the core process of the develop-
ment of culture—and as culture shape humans, of themselves:
Imagination is the basis of all human activity and an important component of all
aspects of cultural life. Absolutely everything around us that was created by the
hand of man, the entire world of human culture, as distinct from the world of
nature, all this is the product of human imagination and of creation based on this
imagination. (Vygotsky 1930/2004, pp. 9–10).
Epistemological Rupture: Imagination as Expansion of Experience
Imagination is a process unfolding in time: in a person’s current apprehension of
reality, something triggers imagination, imagination develops on its own, and even-
tually the person comes back to reality, usually having gained something from that
excursion. Of course, in such a model, “leaving” reality and coming back to it does
not imply literally a change of space; we do not consider imagination as “place”.
Rather, we consider imagination as one modality of apprehending the real, or a
specific mode of experiencing. If most authors explored here would probably agree
with such minimal description of an imaginary loop, our analysis also suggests that
two deeply opposed versions underlie their models.
The first, dominant model in developmental psychology is what we called a deficit
model of imagination (Fig. 2). For authors like Piaget or Pelaprat and Cole, the person
engaged in her daily relationship to the reality meets a problem, a mismatch between
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the flow of the given of experience, and the flow of consciousness: her capacities do
not account for the given of experience. Imagination can repair that relationship, and
allow restarting a better fit between thinking and understanding, and reality. Such
deficit-based model can be seen as the offspring from a certain normative and
epistemological posture. For authors such as Piaget or even Harris, it seems, human
knowledge should allow a better fit to reality—an ultimate capacity to understand it,
predict, and master it.
The second model sees imagination as expansion of experience (Fig. 3). Drawing on
Vygotsky, it sees imagination as one core component of human experience, which not
only participates continuously to our relationship to reality, but also, participates to the
creation of a life which is uniquely human, embedded in its culture and history. The
normative and epistemic underpinning seem thus radically different: authors such as
Vygotsky seem to see an intrinsic value to imagination, poetry and the arts, as other
forms of exploration of human realities, and realizing its potential (Vygotsky 1971,
2004). The goal here is possibly to expand people’s capacities to know and experiment
their being in the world; not to master it.
Time
gap trigger
Experiencing present 
embodied world
Elements feeding imagination
gap
Imaginary loop
Fig. 2 Imaginary loop: gap-filling version
Time
Rupture as disjunction
Experiencing present 
embodied world
Imaginary loop
Elements feeding imagination
Fig. 3 Imaginary loop: expansion version
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Our stance here is that this second line of thinking has a lot to offer, and
that imagination, to be better understood, needs to be considered in its speci-
ficities. However, Vygotsky’s strong insights on imagination have not been
empirically grounded at the time of his life. Since that, and to our knowledge,
although Vygotsky’s contribution to the reflection about imagination is frequent-
ly acknowledged (e.g., Archambault and Venet 2007; Moran and John-Steiner
2003; Smolucha and Smolucha 1986), very little, if no research explores his
intuitions empirically (but see general de Moraes Ramos de Oliveira and
Valsiner 1997).
Our proposition is to identify occurrences of deliberate creation of disrup-
tions, so as to develop a more precise understanding of the processes occurring
at the various steps of the imaginary loop, and its possible contributions to
development. We will explore two empirical examples where the disjunction
from the current flow of experience is guided by specific semiotic resources: a
metaphor, and fiction. As evoked earlier, new metaphors can expose one to a
non-conventional and illogical combination of images or situations, and as such,
are likely to create a gap which consists in an imaginary exploration. Fiction,
on the other side, can be seen as crystallized or objectified personal or
collective imagination, in one or a combination of semiotic codes.
Understanding, and even more, enjoying fiction, demands to abandon the shores
of daily life, and accept to follow the guidance of that artifact, while nourishing
it with one’s own experiences—memories, knowledge, impressions, emotions,
etc.; the actual cultural experience—of watching a movie or reading a book—is
thus a guided experience of imagination. As a consequence, it is quite likely to
change the person’s initial experience (Vygotsky 1971). Note however that the
two examples below have been collected in the frame of research projects of
other phenomena: we present them here because they offer entries in the
processes of imagination.
Children Facing Metaphors in an Experimental Setting
Cerchia (2009, 2011) has explored the work of imagination engaged by French
speaking children aged from 4 to 10 as they are exposed to metaphors. In this
experimental study, children were exposed to four items, each of them
consisting of a short dialogue between two puppets discussing potentially
metaphoric utterances, and about which they were then questioned. In each of
the four dialogues, the children were shown a farm model, with props such as a
house, a field, animals and various equipment, and a couple of farmers called
‘Fabian’ and ‘Laura’ (see Fig. 4 below). The study was initially planned to
capture the development of metaphorical thinking in a Piagetian tradition.
Confronted to the task, some children did not understand the question, or
refused to engage in metaphorical thinking, or engaged in non-canonical imag-
inary explorations. Rather than considering as “failing” the task, Cerchia took
seriously what these children were actually doing and engaged in a qualitative
analysis of experimental dialogues (Cerchia 2011). It appeared that many
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children engaged in what can be considered as imaginary loops. Here is one of
the dialogues as told by the researcher to the child:
One evening, Fabian and Laura put the horses in the paddock to avoid them
leaving during the night. But one of the horses doesn’t want to get in and runs
very quickly and very far.
Fabian tells Laura: ‘Oh! It’s a rocket !’
(C’est une fusée!)
Laura answers him: ‘No, horses do not fly in the sky !’
(Mais non, les chevaux ne volent pas dans le ciel !)
Then the experimenter asks the child: “Why is Fabian talking about a rocket?”.
The expected answer, in such a Piaget-inspired task, was that the children would
explain the link between the horse and the rocket in terms of their common speed,
which would indicate a conventional understanding of metaphors. However, some
children answered in different ways, which we can see as occurrences of the work of
imagination instead of mistakes such as “whateverism” or “fabulation” (Piaget
1926/1999). Here is the example of a young girl called Lynn (5 ; 1).
1 Exp : Why is Fabien talking about a rocket ? 1 Exp : pourquoi il parle de fusée Fabien ?
2 Lynn : Because he thinks horses can fly and I think
he thinks about the horse from.. about the horse
from.. from Hercules
2 Lynn : parce qu’il pense que les chevals ça sait
voler et pis je pense qu’il pense au cheval de… au
cheval de… de Hercule
3 Exp : He thinks about Hercules’ horse 3 Exp : il pense au cheval d’Hercule
4 Lynn : yes I think that he thinks about this 4 Lynn : ouais je pense qu’il pense à ça
5 Exp : why does he thinks about Hercules’ horse 5 Exp : pourquoi il pense au cheval d’Hercule
6 Lynn : because he has wings 6 Lynn : parce qu’il a des ailes
7 Exp : he has wings 7 Exp : il a des ailes
8 Lynn : and he thinks he can fly with his tale and his
manes and so that’s why he speaks about a rocket
8 Lynn : et pis il pense qu’il peut voler avec sa queue et
puis ses crinières alors c’est pour ça qu’il parle de fusée
Fig. 4 Experimental setting
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Lynn is mentioning a fictional character from a children’s carton, Hercule’s horse
(Fig. 5) in the experimental situation. She thus borrows a cultural artifact commonly
circulating and available in the children’s cultural environment, an animated cartoon,
proposing an imaginary world in which horses fly.
In the following example, Alexis (7 ; 8) is also answering to the same dialogue.
Contrarily to Lynn, he does not mention a shared cultural artifact, but rather, he
invents on the spot his own version of a hybrid animal, involving a fusion procedure
commonly used in animated cartoons and mythology:
1. Alexis : because he, he really believed he had the
image of the whole racket
1 Alexis: parce que lui il croyait vraiment il avait
l’image de la fusée toute entière
2 Exp : yes 2 Exp : ouais…
3 Alexis : and he confused himself with a horse
because he put himself straight in front of the racket
and he had dreamt a little bit then after, the horse, he
thought he put himself with (…)
3 Alexis : pis il s’est confondu avec un cheval parce
qu’il s’était mis en plein devant la fusée pis il avait
un peu rêvé donc après le cheval, il a cru qu’il s’était
mis avec pis ben après … (…)
4 Alexis : yes then the horse he was with he was
in the middle of because the horse he run next
to the other field of the horse, then after his
horse was a rocket and after the other horse got
mixed up and after it made of a bit of a horse
with a bit of a rocket
4 Alexis : ouais pis le cheval il était avec il était en
plein dans pasque le ch’val il était couru à côté de
l’autre pré du cheval, donc après lui son cheval
c’était une fusée pis après l’autre cheval il s’est
mélangé donc après ça a fait un bout d’un cheval et
un bout d’une fusée.
Trying to make sense of this metaphorical dialogue proposed in this exper-
imental setting, Alexis explores its imaged side. He thus proposes that Fabien
had a dream (3) or that he has “the image of the whole racket” (1). In his
dream, Fabien has “confused” (3)—or fused—the image of the racket with that
of the horse, to produce a “mix up” (4), a hybrid half-horse, half-rocket being.
Fig. 5 Hercule’s horse
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Later, asked by the researcher, Alexis draws that creature (Fig. 6) and describes
it:
5 Alexis : so he was there then he didn’t understand,
because a horse with a rocket, he said well it must be
quick
5 Alexis : pis il était comme ça ben il comprenait
pas, parce qu’une fusée avec un cheval, euh il disait
bon ça doit aller vite.
6 Exp: yeah 6 Exp : ouais/
7 Alexis : but actually it was rather the the horse was
on the top because so so it makes a reactor
7 Alexis : sauf que c’était plutôt le le le cheval il était
en haut parce que comme ça ça fait le réacteur.
8 Exp : the horse was what ? 8 Exp : le cheval était quoi?
9 Alexis : he was for example it would pass and it
was the top it was not at the bottom otherwise there
would not be the reactor
9 Alexis : il était par exemple ça passait et il était le
haut c’était pas le bas parce que sinon il y avait pas
le réacteur
10 Exp : yes ok 10 Exp : ouais dacc
11 Alexis : so that was… what he was dreaming.. 11 Alexis : donc c’est ça.... qu’il rêvait…
How can we understand these unexpected answers in terms of the work of
imagination? We answer by decomposing the imaginary loop describe above,
into what triggers it, what it is nourished with, and what outcomes it has.
1) The rupture: In this unfamiliar experimental situation (Elbers and
Keldermann 1994), the children are exposed to a foreign situation—the
experimental pseudo-game—in which they are asked by an adult to explain
a metaphor—a statement about a horse and about a rocket—which can be
seen as an unusual combination of perspectives (Cerchia 2009). The re-
searcher’s question, which socially forces the children to consider it seri-
ously, focuses precisely on that discrepancy. Hence the disruption is the
apparent absurdity of the metaphor caused by the conflict between two
representations—and as such it triggers the children’s imagination. Cerchia
(2011) noticed also that the disruption could be caused by the strangeness
of the experimental setting, especially for young children used to pedagog-
ical or playful ones. But these aspects will not be analysed here.
2) What is it nourished with? To make sense of the situation, the children draw
on existing cultural artifacts and conventions, available in their environ-
ment. Lynn is using a mythological figure from a cartoon—that of Hercule
Fig. 6 Horse-rocket
318 Integr Psych Behav (2013) 47:305–324
—as symbolic resource (Zittoun 2006a, b) to make sense of the metaphor.
As noticed by Rubin and Livesay (2006) in the field of clinical practice,
the multimedia genre of superhero mythology provides children with fic-
tions that serve as resources for developmental functions such as emotional
release or problem solving. Alexis is building a hybrid creature as he might
have seen in other cartoons or met in tales and other stories, also using a
conventional semiotic operation.
3) What does it enable to do? Asked by an adult to answer to an apparently
absurd question, the child engaging in the work of imagination finds a
viable solution: he engages in a “bricolage” (in the sense proposed by
Levi-Strauss 1966), using bits of cultural elements which he has internal-
ized, to produce a new, innovative answer. Doing so, the child is both
making sense of the specific question, and respecting the rules of an
asymmetric conversation situation in which the child is expected to answer
the adult’s request. Eventually, the child might also develop his capacity to
understand metaphors…
Young Adults Reasoning about Fiction
Zittoun has on her side explored the role of fiction in the development of young
persons and adults when these become symbolic resources (2004; 2006a; 2007b). In
some conditions, people emotionally invest, or resonate with, books, films or songs—
cultural elements demanding an imaginary experience. It appears that through the
cultural experience created by the cultural elements, or after it, people change their
understanding of an otherwise problematic real-life situation. For instance, a young
woman might better understanding and then regulate her feelings after a loss through
her resonance with a melody or characters of a movie (Zittoun 2007a, 2008), or a
young man might better understand his existential situation after moving places
by using the narrative structure of a novel to organize and reflect upon it
(Zittoun 2006b, 2007b). One way to understand the developmental function of
uses of symbolic resources is precisely to consider them as one of the possible
way to facilitate and guide an imaginary experience in situation of ruptures in
the continuity of people’s lives.
As part of a wider project on the place of literature and philosophy in their life
(Grossen et al. 2012; Zittoun and Grossen 2012), we interviewed 20 young adults
about their cultural experiences in and out of school.7 The following sequence comes
from an interview with Gaëtane, a student in a pre-academic track explaining why she
liked The Great Gatsby (Fitzgerald 2000).
I Do you know what you liked in The Great Gatsby?
G Mm The characters. Or rather, what I liked is the hypocrisy, that one can feel
in the book the characters are hypocritical one with another. Well I have the
impression that it is a bit like today’s society, because although the book has
been written in the 20’s I think it is still present this hypocrisy between people
7 SYRES project (Symbolic resources in secondary school), by T. Zittoun and M. Grossen, and the
collaboration of O. Lempen, C. Matthey, S. Padiglia and J. Ros, supported by the Swiss National Fund.
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I Yes? (..) and you say this as general impression or in link with personal
events ?
G Both. I have always been told not to trust people (a..) and I tend to do the
opposite, to be very straightforward and believe in people’s friendship, and I
often had to destroy my illusions, I realized friends were not really friends and it
was hypocritical towards me (..)
Contrarily to the first example, here the experience of imagination is described
after it already took place. However, based on the context and previous in-depth
analyses of this case and other uses of symbolic resources (Zittoun 2006a) we can
propose a tentative analysis in the terms proposed here.
1) The rupture: The rupture is alluded to when Gaëtane explains what events she
felt as resonating to her reading of the novel: the discovery that supposed friends
were actually able to betray her and were not deserving her trust. One might say
that it is this disjunction between Gaëtane’s previous beliefs about the world and
the values guiding her action—to be trusting, straightforward—and her experi-
ence of being betrayed that generates disruption.
2) What is it nourished with? In this sequence, it is very clearly the novel Great
Gatsby which guides Gaëtane’s imagination, and this in two senses. First,
Gaëtane’s discourse suggests that she had an intense cultural experience—
the fictional experience as she was reading the book. She could probably
vicariously “live” the imaginary world and narrative proposed, which
allowed her to meet certain characters and follow plots. Certain aspects
of that imaginary experience appeared to have resonated with memories of
past or present real situations. Second, when Gaëtane recalls that experi-
ence of reading, as here in the interview, she draws or reactivates some
part of this experience of guided imagination.
3) What does it enable to do? Through resonance between narrative and personal
experience, the work of imagination can be nourished with real emotions, and it
can in turn guide the reader’s experience through some ways of naming, distanc-
ing or transforming them. Here, Gaëtane explains to the interviewer, having met
in fiction certain hypocrisy (clearly recognizable) allows her to identify or read
hypocrisy around her. In other words, after the experience of imagination—
through inner dialogue or real dialogue, as here with the interviewer, Gaëtane
could reflect on the imaginary experience, and from this reflexive stance, now
examine differently her daily experiences of meeting more or less trustworthy
others. Hence, the loop brings Gaëtane to a richer or more nuanced experience of
the world.
In other words, the process of imagination guided Gaëtane in relatively abstract
and complex experiences (related to human characters and values), allowing to
address one particular rupture in her experience: that of the mismatch between her
experience of being open and honest to people, and their reactions which cannot be
understood. Imagination here brought her to develop new culturally guided perspec-
tives, which now enrich her dealing with real life experiences.
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Openings
In this paper, we reread classical theorizations of imagination. We proposed that
imagination appears in some disjunction between the flow of embodied experience,
anchored in the unfolding reality, and the flow of inner life or consciousness.
Imagination is likely to be triggered by a disjunction between these, or, might be
culturally guided or triggered. Through this reading, we moved away from ap-
proaches inspired by classical associationist models for which imagination mainly
demands the mental recombination of images or representations already in mind.
Furthermore, we took some distance from authors who, such as Harris or Piaget,
analyze imagination mainly in cognitive terms, considering it as essentially non-
verbal and non-social process. In contrast, Vygotsky proposed to see imagination as
the capacity to take distance—more or less consciously, more or less reflexively—
from one’s awareness of the unfolding reality. Distancing is made possible thanks to
one’s internalized semiotic means, among which language, but also other semiotic
modes (music or the visual arts).8 As a consequence of this, first, imagination can be
seen as always and necessarily social and cultural; and second, it can radically allow
new perspectives. In that sense, Vygotsky sees imagination as an expansion of human
experience; part of the generation of one’s own zone of proximal development, it is a
key process in human development. This raises various issues, which we will
promptly present, and that constitute the program for future work.
First, from a developmental perspective, imagination is a modality of experiencing
which can have the same level of complexity than any other thinking capacities of a
particular person at some point in her life. Although our two examples are taken from
rather different studies, we might say that they both show people engaging in
imaginary loops, nourished by cultural elements, both relatively widely diffused—
the child refers to children’s stories while the adolescent refers to a novel. The child
and the adolescent have different life experiences as well as different masteries of
semiotic systems (e.g., the adolescent has learned to analyze literature at school, she
masters a “secondary knowledge”). Both loops bring them back to the real with some
expanded understanding; the child, about the unfamiliar experimental situation, about
an idea so far un-thought, and the very fact that one can enage in an imaginary
exploration to answer an adult’s question; the adolescent, about her relations to
others. Both loops are thus temporary zones of proximal development. Through it,
the child creates a hybrid object; the adolescent masters a new category to read the
world and a new personal experience to refer to. On the other hand, the adolescent
here appears having acquired more distance from the experience through the loop—
moving from specific cases to categories; and rereading her past, so as to allow new
futures—than the child, who more modestly connects past meeting with fiction with
the immediate future of making sense of the situation. That difference can be
understood as due to different configurations: the actual situations about which the
imagination occurs; the person actual maturation and capacities to engage in dis-
8 Ricoeur’s hermeneutic analysis goes in the same direction; for him, creativity in the discourse can occur
through metaphors which are themselves embedded in language which has the capacity to trigger specific
meanings—therefore his notion of “canonicity of sense”; however, his analysis is not sociocultural.
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tanced thinking, partly due to the mastery of specific semiotic modalities; and social
and cultural demands upon specific life periods (typically, adolescence involves more
challenging social relations, and might require more normative explorations of the
future). Given the complexity of such dynamic configurations, we therefore abstain to
say more about developmental differences; and we rather carefully call for longitu-
dinal studies of imagination through the life-course.
Second, what processes are engaged in imaginary loops need to be further
described and explained. Following Vygotsky’s understanding of the semiotic nature
of these imaginary processes, we can draw on recent semiotic theorization of think-
ing, inviting microgenetic analysis of these loops, as for instance has been done in a
dialogical perspective (Wagoner et al. 2011 ; Zittoun 2008), or in a lifecourse
perspective (Zittoun et al. 2013). This we will develop in our next work.
Third, in our understanding, imagination is not limited by the borders of the demand
of socially shared or materially constrained reality, it allows an as-if mode—which can
be fictional, playful, hypothetical, counterfactual, retrospective or prospective mode—to
create, on a mental plane, alternative realities, recomposing the given or enriching it. Our
proposal is thus that imagination makes fire of any wood: in the process of imagination,
people draw on their own experience, on that of others, on images and fiction, on social
representations or natural motives, etc. Finally, the process of imagination might thus,
through these multiple modalities, come to new perspectives, ideas, or modes of acting
which open new avenues in the real world. Altogether, then, imagination might be a too-
ignored, yet fundamental process at the heart of most complex thinking. The conse-
quences of this proposal will then also have to be further explored.
Hence our overall proposal comes to simply inverse the paradigmatic view
underlining most of current developmental work on imagination: most of it considers
is as deficitary—not as good as reasoning, yet like reasoning, tending to usefully
promote a better fit to reality. By assessing, after Vygotsky and some others, that
actually imagination might be one fundamental way of bringing newness and change
in thinking, we propose to reopen that line of thinking, and we can only call for
theoretical and empirical work which would allow to study not only the role of
imagination in development all life long, but also, the sociocultural development of
imagination itself.
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